Algorithmic mechanism design

Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) lies at the intersection of economic game theory, optimization, and computer science. The prototypical problem in mechanism design is to design a system for multiple self-interested participants, such that the participants' self-interested actions at equilibrium lead to good system performance. Typical objectives studied include revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. Algorithmic mechanism design differs from classical economic mechanism design in several respects. It typically employs the analytic tools of theoretical computer science, such as worst case analysis and approximation ratios, in contrast to classical mechanism design in economics which often makes distributional assumptions about the agents. It also considers computational cons

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enAlgorithmic mechanism design (AMD) lies at the intersection of economic game theory, optimization, and computer science. The prototypical problem in mechanism design is to design a system for multiple self-interested participants, such that the participants' self-interested actions at equilibrium lead to good system performance. Typical objectives studied include revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. Algorithmic mechanism design differs from classical economic mechanism design in several respects. It typically employs the analytic tools of theoretical computer science, such as worst case analysis and approximation ratios, in contrast to classical mechanism design in economics which often makes distributional assumptions about the agents. It also considers computational cons
Has abstract
enAlgorithmic mechanism design (AMD) lies at the intersection of economic game theory, optimization, and computer science. The prototypical problem in mechanism design is to design a system for multiple self-interested participants, such that the participants' self-interested actions at equilibrium lead to good system performance. Typical objectives studied include revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. Algorithmic mechanism design differs from classical economic mechanism design in several respects. It typically employs the analytic tools of theoretical computer science, such as worst case analysis and approximation ratios, in contrast to classical mechanism design in economics which often makes distributional assumptions about the agents. It also considers computational constraints to be of central importance: mechanisms that cannot be efficiently implemented in polynomial time are not considered to be viable solutions to a mechanism design problem. This often, for example, rules out the classic economic mechanism, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction.
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Algorithmic mechanism design
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enAlgorithmic mechanism design
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www.cs.uu.nl/docs/vakken/msagi/mech_design.pdf
web.archive.org/web/20150613164748/http:/www.cs.uu.nl/docs/vakken/msagi/mech_design.pdf
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Algorithmic game theory
Approximation ratio
Category:Algorithms
Category:Game theory
Category:Mechanism design
Computational social choice
Computer science
Game theory
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Incentive compatible
Mechanism design
Metagame
Noam Nisan
Optimization
Theoretical computer science
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
Worst case analysis
SameAs
4NUnY
m.0b750dh
Q4724367
תכנון מנגנונים אלגוריתמי
Subject
Category:Algorithms
Category:Game theory
Category:Mechanism design
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