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Creator |
394fe1c03e7511826a1849fb411af886 |
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Creator |
ext-be02af75c1adc27ad61aafdaa4069b96 |
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Date |
2013-12 |
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Is Part Of |
repository |
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abstract |
In 1919 President Woodrow Wilson famously called for a system of “open covenants.....
openly arrived at.” He may not quite have lived up to his own aspirations, but the
idea that international law-making should be an open and transparent process has proved
a very sturdy implant. This chapter is particularly concerned with transparency as
it affects international law-making. More specifically, we will consider transparency
mainly from the stand-point of multilateral treaty negotiation but the points made
here are equally relevant to other forms, including soft-law declarations and resolutions.
At the outset it is worth asking why we should examine the principle of transparency
in international law-making. At the domestic level there exists an obvious need to
justify and legitimise the laws, policies, and decisions of public bodies in a democratic
state accountable to the electorate. Modern legislatures are transparent insofar as
they normally allow some degree of public access, and their proceedings are televised
and reported by the press. One writer suggests that transparency has ‘attained quasi-religious
significance in debate over governance and institutional design.’ In this context
the role of transparency is to contribute to democratic accountability and public
participation in governance, while facilitating free speech and freedom of information
about law-making and public affairs. On the international level where the interchange
is primarily between States and the law-making institutions are not meaningfully democratic,
it might be thought that transparency is less necessary; indeed it may even be seen
as counter-productive in what is essentially a negotiating process. No negotiator
would wish to reveal their position ahead of any dialogue. Some may feel it necessary
to conceal their true position even after negotiations have concluded, if only to
sustain illusions on both sides. Plainly, there are limits to the utility of transparency
and its virtues must be balanced against other potential drawbacks. In politics, as
in life, complete openness is rarely beneficial or desirable. |
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authorList |
authors |
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editorList |
editors |
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status |
nonPeerReviewed |
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type |
Article |
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type |
BookSection |
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label |
Boyle, Alan and McCall-Smith, Kasey (2013). Transparency in international law-making.
In: Bianchi, Andrea and Peters, Anne eds. Transparency in International Law.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 419–435. |
37780 |
label |
Boyle, Alan and McCall-Smith, Kasey (2013). Transparency in international law-making.
In: Bianchi, Andrea and Peters, Anne eds. Transparency in International Law.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 419–435. |
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Publisher |
ext-7dc6ac206349427818537421ac9815ec |
37780 |
Title |
Transparency in international law-making |
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in dataset |
oro |